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2Randall Johnston Pozdena*
The semiconductorindustry hasplayeda key role in internationaltrade
disputes. Using data on Dynamic Random Access Memory devices and
semiconductor chip fabrication facilities, this analysis examines the
behavior of the industry for evidence of the influence of time-related
technological change, economies ofscale, learning curve behavior, and
internationaldifferences in strategicpricing behavior. The analysisfinds
only weak evidence ofanti-competitive behavior.
The pace ofinnovation in the field ofelectronics
has been extremely rapid in the last thirty years, and
hightechnology electronicshas been a majorsource
ofstrength for theAmericaneconomy. Thedevelop-
mentofsolid statedevices- and integratedcircuits
inparticular- has beenthe majorcontributorto the
startling evolution ofthis field and the entry ofhigh
technology electronics into so many aspects ofdaily
life. In addition, many place their hopes for con-
tinued growth of the national and regional econo-
mies on intensified innovation in and application of
high technology electronics. Along with bio-
technology, high technology electronics is seen as a
kingpin of the future ofthe American economy.
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate popular
claims that the semiconductor industry is suscepti-
ble to anticompetitive behavior, particularly on the
part of foreign competitors. Specifically, we will
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examine the market for a particular integrated cir-
cuit (Ie) device for evidence ofimperfectly compet-
itive performance. Learning and scale economies
are found to be significant in this industry, and
market structure while not showing excessive
concentration ofmarket share exhibited rigidity.
Combined, these observations are consistent with
what one would find where inefficient forms of
strategic pricing behavior are practiced.
Production functions associated with integrated
circuit fabrication facilities located in the United
States and Japan are estimated to provide an insight
into the origins of alleged international differences
in pricing strategies. Only weakevidenceis found to
support the notion that Japanese integrated circuit
(IC) fabrication costs are below those oftheir U.S.
counterparts.
In Section Iofthis paper, a briefdescriptionofthe
semiconductor industry and its products is pre-
sented. Section II contains a description of the IC
production process and an economic characteriza-
tion of this process. Section III discusses potential
implications of the production environment on
industry structure and performance. In Section IV,
several simple empirical investigations are per-
formed to assess the importance of learning and
scale economies in the IC industry and to investi-
gate the origins of differences in U.S. and foreign
firm pricing strategies. The paper concludes with a
summary of findings and their implications for the
future ofthe U.S. semiconductor industry.I. The Industry and Us Products
The history of the semiconductor industry, its
technology and products are discussed in a number
of published sources l . It is useful, however, to
review the basic features of the industry and its
technology both to support the logic of subsequent
discussion and to delimit the economic issues we
will address.
The semiconductor industry is so named because
it produces devices that exploit the special electrical
characteristics of a class of natural elements and
compounds known as "semiconductors" (such as
silicon, germanium and gallium arsenide). The
materials have the property that they can be made to
behave alternately as conductors or barriers to the
flow ofelectrical current. In the late 1940s, discov-
ery of a means of managing the behavior of semi-
.conductor crystals led to the development of the
transistor - a device that uses small currents to
control the conduction behavior of the material.
Thus, the transistor can form the basis ofan ampli-
fier or electronic switch.
Through the 1950s and 1960s, the transistor
rapidly replaced the vacuum tube because of its
superiorruggedness, smallersize, lowerpowercon-
sumption, and ability to execute tasks more rapidly.
Before 1958, functional electronic devices were
built by connecting a number of transistors and
other electronic components in a discrete manner.
Then, two scientists developed the "integrated cir-
cuit" or IC, which is a single device combining the
functions of a number of transistors. By so doing,
ICs opened the possibility of constructing more
efficient and compact electronic devices.
The first ICs were produced in commercial vol-
ume in the mid-1960s. They are produced by a
complex process of etching, "doping" the crys-
talline material with other elements, and heat-treat-
ing the surface of a semiconductor crystal wafer.
Today, a 5-inch diameter wafer of silicon can yield
one hundred or more "chips", each of which may
contain as many as 1 million transistors. Although
"discrete" devices are still produced, the IC is now
the dominant semiconductor product and has revo-
lutionized industrial and consumer electronic prod-
ucts. In 1985, approximately $16.5 billion in IC
shipments were made worldwide, against about $5
billion in shipments ofdiscrete devices2.
Despite wide variation in the types of functions
that ICs can perform, the same basic production
process is used in their manufacture. Micro-
processors (the "brain" ofcomputational devices),
memory devices (for storing information), and a
wide variety of standard circuits used in consumer
electronics, telecommunications devices, and mili-
tary hardware all involve similar production pro-
cedures3. By focusing our attention on ICs in gen-
eral, and memory devices in particular later in the
paper, we hopeto make useful generalizations about
the semiconductor industry.
II. The Economics of Ie Production
The focus of this paper is on factors influencing
the structure and future international competitive-
ness of the American semiconductor industry. We
begin with a brief description ofthe IC production
process. Certain aspects ofthis process are unusual
and, when considered in light of U.S. patent law
and the alleged industrial policies of foreign com-
petitors, may be important determinants of the
structure, performance, and international competi-
tiveness of the American semiconductor industry.
Major Features of the Production Process
The production of integrated circuits involves
very large pre-production investment. Such invest-
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ment takes the form ofcircuit layout development,
development of "maskworks" or templates to
imbed the circuitry in the surface of the semicon-
ductor material, and development and testing of
prototypes. Because the prototypes often do not
behave as modelled during the layout development
process, many cycles ofthe prototype development
process may be required before a useful design
evolves. This basic circuit design process interacts
with the design of the fabrication process and, in
some cases, with the design of other chips or
"firmware" (programming incorporated into ICs).
In total, this preproduction investment may cost as
much as $100 million in the case of a new micro-processor chip4.
Actual fabrication ofthe integrated circuits takes
place in a fabrication line ("fab line") facility.
Wafers ofthe semiconductorcrystal (predominantly
silicon) enter one end of the fab line and the fab-
ricated IC exits the production process after various
stages ofchemical and heat treatment, "dicing" of
the wafer into constituent chips, and electrical and
physical attachmentofthe chip to its plug-like base.
It is conventional to describe the capacity and
activity levels on afab line in terms of"waferstarts"
perweek. The relationship between wafer starts and
actual production flow ofICs, however, will depend
upon the design of the device being fabricated, the
size of the wafer stock, and the efficiency of the
fabrication process, which generally is higher on
lines with newer vintage fabrication equipment and
higher quality labor.
Labor and capital are substitutable to some
degree in most of the steps of the fabrication pro-
cess. Once a fabrication process has been config-
ured, however, significant changes in the process
can be costly and time-consuming. Similarly,
although a single fab line can, within limits, be used
to produce a variety of devices, different types of
devices involve different processing steps and
sequences, new computer programs to guide those
steps, and can involve changes in the degree of
cleanliness ofthe fab line environment. Crossovers
to radically different devices, therefore, also are
costly5.
Short-Run and long-Run Costs of
Production
The characterization ofIC products and the pro-
duction process made above can be re-stated in
conventional economic terms as follows. First, the
product in the IC industry is probably best thought
ofnot as the IC itself, butrather, theunits ofmemory
storage, switching, or logical processing functions
it provides. Although there are qualitative dif-
ferences across IC devices providing these various
functions (such as access speed in memory devices
or the compactness of the IC device that contains
them), it is helpful to think ofthe market as demand-
ing memory storage or other functions rather than
ICsperse. Then, within gross functional categories
at least, the elemental unit of output relates to the
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fundamental electronic building block of the IC,
namely the transistor.
In the short run, fab line capital and the capital
representing the design of the IC (the maskworks)
are fixed. Output is varied by the firm by manipulat-
ing labor and materials inputs. It seems clear that
average total short-run costs decline sharply with
increased output because oflarge, fixed maskwork
and fab line capital costs. At production levels
above the design capacity ofa firm's fab line facili-
ties, however, problems ofcongestion likely arise.
Each ofthe 50 to 100 processing steps takes a finite
amount of time and few opportunities exist in the
short run to accelerate the processing or to improve
the yield ofuseful output from wafer starts~. Thus,
in the short run, rising average variable costs likely
causeaverage totalcosts to rise athigh outputlevels.
In the long run, both fab line capital and mask-
work capital are variable, and there are several
potential sources ofincreasing returns to scale. One
is that larger fab line facilities offer lower unit
fabrication costs than smaller ones. The industry's
practice, however, has been to manipulate the num-
ber rather than the size offab lines to alter fab line
capacity, suggesting that individual fab line scale is
not a major source ofeconomies ofscale generally.
Of the 1,500 or so fab lines in existence in 1986,
two-thirds had design capacities between 1,500 and
4,300 wafer starts per week? If fabrication were
an important source ofscale economies, its effects,
therefore, must be derived from firm-level synergies
from operating multiple lines. (The issue offabrica-
tion scale economies is explored further below.)
Increases in the firm's stock of "maskwork capi-
tal" also could result in lower long-run average
costs. Conceptually, we might view improvements
in maskworks and manipulation ofprocessing steps
(that is, alteration in the design ofthe Ie) as either
an increase in the employment ofmaskwork "capi-
tal" or a change in technology. Technological
change is usually assumed to be exogenous to the
firm's laborand capital allocationdecisions (thatis,
technical change depends only upon the passage of
time) whereas investments in what we are calling
"maskwork capital" have been an important com-
ponent ofIC firms' cost-minimization strategy.
Indeed, the commitmentofresources to chip (and
fabrication process) design is probably responsiblefor most of the widely touted, sharp declines in IC
product costs that have been observed over time. IC
engineers have succeeded in increasing the number
ofelemental components ("transistors") thatcan be
accommodated by a single semiconductor chip of
given physical dimensions and, hence, reducing the
unit cost of fabricating IC products. (Empirical
evidence will be presented in Section IV below on
the relative contribution ofscale economies and the
passage of time to the decline in the cost of IC
memory products.)
Technological Diffusion and learning
Two other aspects of the IC production environ-
ment are relevant to understanding the current and
likely future performance of the IC industry. The
first is that property rights in "maskwork capital"
historically have been poorly defined, making it
difficult for one firm to prevent access to the fruits of
its investment by other firms. Itis relatively easy to
reconstruct the design and manufacturing steps
involved in an IC product through a process known
as "reverse engineering"9. By a sequence of pho-
tographic analysis, disassembly by etching, and
materials analysis, a rival firm can reconstruct the
architecture ofa functional chip and the maskworks
and processing steps necessaryto reproduce it. Such
"reverse engineering" can cost as little as one-one
thousandth of the original firm's investmentlO and
permit "pirate" firms to enjoy lowertotal costs. The
passage of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act
of 1984 foreclosed the possibility of precise
"cloning" of maskwork capital by foreign or
domestic competitors, although the more general
practice ofreverse engineering remains legal1I.
A second often-cited feature ofthe IC industry is
the relevance of"learning curve" phenomena to IC
production. The notion is simply that the cost of
production may be related not only to the rate of
outputofafirm (economies ofscale) and changes in
technology over time but also to the independent
effect of accumulated production experience. Such
a phenomenon is considered to be relevant to com-
plex manufacturing technologies: as output experi-
ence increases, the firm betterunderstands the tech-
nology involved and technical efficiency
increases12.
Since integrated circuit manufacturing is an
extremely complicated technical process, it seems
likely a priorithatlearning-relatedcostadjustments
may occur. The implications ofleamingphenomena
and a test for their existence are presented below.
To summarize, the IC production process is a
highly technical one involving large investments in
maskwork capital that are difficult to recover if an
enterprise fails anddifficultto protectfrom exploita-
tion by other firms. Potentially significant econo-
mies of scale are likely, and probably flow mainly
from economies at the level of the firm rather than
the plant (that is, the fab line). Costs also may
decline over time because oftechnological progress
and with accumulated output experience because of
"leaming curve" phenomena.
III. Implications for Industry Structure and Performance
The preceding discussion of the economic Scale Economies and Contestability
characteristics of the IC industry may help explain The economic characteristics of the IC industry
the likely structure and behavior of the industry, make it likely that the production ofICs is charac-
particularly whether the industry exhibits charac- terized by economies of scale. Significant scale
teristics that may make it vulnerable to anticompeti- economies, in tum, would mean that markets for IC
tive behavior. It has been widely alleged, for exam- products will tend to be concentrated in the long
pIe, that Japanese producers have pursued predatory run, and thus have the potential for inefficiency.
pricing strategies in certain IC products 13. In this Baumol and Baileyl4, however, have argued that
section, the implications ofthe postulatedeconomic high levels ofconcentration (or even monopoly) in
characteristics for structure and performance are production need not have serious effects on market
discussed as a prelude to attempts at empirical efficiency ifthe market were "contestable". For an
verification.
44industry to be considered contestable (in the sense
that Bailey and Baumol use the term), it must be
possible for new firms to enter a market displaying
abnormal profits and earn normal profits or if
extant firms cut prices to thwart the new entry -
leave the·industry without losing the investment
associated with entry.
At least one attribute ofthe IC industry suggests
that it may not be ideally contestable: a major cost
ofentry preproductionresearch and development
- is difficultto recoverifthe firm is unsuccessful in
competing against extant producers and must exit
the market. In this respect, the IC industry contrasts
with most manufacturing, transportation and ser-
vice industries for which acquisition of re-sellable,
fixed assets is the dominant cost of entering a
market. Thus, "contesting" for markets may not be
an effective means of imposing competitive disci-
pline within the IC industry. This makes it
especially important to investigate that industry's
scale economies.
learning and IC Market Efficiency
In Section I, we also postulated that IC produc-
tion occurs in the presence ofa learning curve. The
existence of learning effects on unit production
costs may have a bearing on both industry structure
and pricing behavior and, thereby, on the efficiency
of the IC industry. The logic of these effects in a
model of dynamic entry and pricing behavior has
been demonstrated rigorously by Spence15. The
implications of his model will only be summarized
briefly here.
First, iflearning (production experience) reduces
costs, Spence has demonstrated that, under certain
theoretical conditions, learning can confer some
protection from competitive entry to the first firm
into a market, in effect, simulating an entry barrier.
If"first movers" do enjoy such advantages in the IC
industry, then market structure might be expectedto
be rigid over time that is, show little change in
the rank and share of firms in the market.
The second aspect of learning curve theory of
interest here are the effects ofthe learning curve on
pricing behavior. In essence, because production
experience confers subsequent cost advantages on
the firm, a firm maximizing long lun profits in the
presence of a learning curve will charge less (and
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produce more) in the leamingstage of production
than dictated by short run profit maximization con-
siderations alone.
Not all environments areconduciveto such learn-
ing curve pricing behavior, however. Whereas firms
in an industry composed ofjust a few firms are able
to exploit a learning-curve pricing strategy, Spence
argues that strategy is less effective in unconcen-
tratedproductionenvironments where there is asser-
tion ofcompetitive price discipline with successful
entry.
In addition, whetherlearning is importantat all to
either pricing behavior or market structure depends
upon how "rapidly" learning takes place. Iflearn-
ing were very rapid (that is, the effects of accumu-
lated production experience are small relative to the
effects of current production on costs), then there
would be few strategic advantages to deviating from
short run profit maximization. A related point con-
cerns how rapidly learning reaches other firms. If
such diffusion is very rapid, accumulated output
might help explain cost and price trends for the
industry as a whole, but current prices would be
determined by current costs.
The implications of Spence's view for the IC
industry might be summarized as follows. !flearn-
ing (cumulative output) were important to firms in
the IC industry, then early entrants able to survive
initial periods oflow prices might gain an (at least
temporary) advantage over later entrants. Market
structure would be less fluid than otherwise, and
such "first movers" could enjoy higher profits than
subsequent rivals. Firms, in tum, would have a
strategic incentive to pursue an early-entry strategy.
International Competition inthe IC Industry
For American IC producers, concerns over pre-
production costs and scale economies, con-
testability, and learning phenomena seem to be at
the root ofcurrent debates over the marketing strat-
egies of their Japanese competitors. Japanese pro-
ducers have gained a growing share of the world
semiconductor market; their share of combined
U.S.-Japanese production has risen from 33 percent
in 1971 to over 50 percent in 1982. Since 1982, the
U.S. share of world IC sales has fallen from about
60 percent to 50 percent, while the Japanese share
has risen from 30 to about 40 percent1Sa.It is frequently alleged that the Japanese have
obtainedtheirgrowing shareoncsales by pursuing
"predatory" pricing strategies. In particular, Jap-
anese IC manufacturers have beenaccused ofselling
Ieproducts in world markets at prices below their
cost ofproduction. In 1986, for example, there were
three major International Trade Commission com-
plaints alleging such behaviorfiled by the American
industry and the U.S. government1 6.
Iftrue, one explanation for such pricing behavior
would be the existence ofexploitable learning curve
advantages, although any IC firm - not only the
Japanese ones - could exploit those advantages.
Nevertheless, it is argued frequently that Japanese
IC producers are better able to survive the early
periods of low profitability necessary to secure
market dominance in a "learning" dominated pro-
duction environment. They are alleged to benefit
from their affiliation with conglomerate manufac-
turing organizations, which underwrite early peri-
ods of low profitability, and the availability ofsub-
sidies from the Ministry ofInternational Trade and
Industry (MITI) and the banking industry17.
Whether such subsidization occurs (or differs dra-
matically from support the U.S. IC industry has
received from the military) has been debated exten-
sively18.
A second alleged reason for the growth in Jap-
anese IC market share is that low technological and
legalbarriers to copying U.S. designs and processes
have unfairly teduced the total costs faced by Jap-
anese producers. Particularly egregious cases of
apparent cloning indeed can be documentedl9. In
addition, the property rights traditionally extended
by the Japanese to foreign creators of intellectual
property have been criticized as being weak by
international standards. In the debate over software
copyright reform from 1983 to 1985, for example,
the Japanese proposed standards of protection were
weaker than both international copyright standards
and the standards applied to domestic (Japanese)
copyrights20.
As Dasgupta and Stiglitz21 have pointed out, ill-
defined intellectual property rights can reduce inno-
vation below the socially optimal level. However,
for low barriers to cloning to have a permanent
effect favoring Japanese over U.S. production, the
ability to "reverse engineer" acompetitor's product
must be asymmetric internationally which it is not,
and some other factor must operate to "cement"
market dominance once dominance is achieved by
this means.
Finally, it is possible that growth in the Japanese
IC market share flows from legitimate differences in
fabrication cost. These differences could arise from
lower costs for labor of a given quality or superior
Japanese management offabrication facilities. (It is
unlikely that differences in materials or equipment
costs would be as important since most ofthe wafer
stockand fab line equipmenthas been manufactured
by one country: the U.S.) The theory of interna-
tional factor price equalization22 argues against the
lower labor cost argument, but foreign producers
could still have the comparative advantage if they
have a greater endowment of relevant production
factors23.
IV. Empirical Examination of the Ie Industry
Several empirical investigations may inform our
understanding of the structure and performance of
the IC industry. First, a study of market share
rigidity may shed light on the structure of the IC
market. Market shares that appear to be rigid over
time might indicate that the market is not easily
contestable, or that learning phenomena operate to
retard entry.
Second, we could test directly for the existence of
learning phenomena by examining the response of
costs to cumulative firm output - costs should
decline with accumulated output experience. In
addition, if a high degree of market concentration
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were associated with lowerIC prices (an association
not normally expected except in the presence of a
learning curve or other strategic pricing considera-
tions), learning in the IC industry would be more
likely to be firm-specific (that is, it would not
diffuse so rapidly that it did not influence firm
behavior).
Third, the relationship between the scale ofpro-
duction and cost also would be of interest. Ifscale
economies were not extremely great, the industry
would be less likely to be concentrated, and the
potential distortions caused by lack ofcontestability
or other constraints on the fluidity of the industrywould be less important.
Finally, to address concerns about the behaviorof
foreign competitors, it would be helpful to compare
fabrication costs in Japanese and U.S. facilities. If
Japanese IC prices were below their American
counterparts' but fabrication costs were the same,
we might have evidence that Japanese producers
were pricing below the full cost of production,
including the cost of maskwork capital.
Unfortunately, the data available on the IC indus-
try are not ideal for examining all ofthese relation-
ships. No cost data are available and they would be
suspect in any case, since the cost of producing a
specific product is difficult to extract in aconglome-
rate enterprise. This is a particularly serious short-
coming in studying Japanese Ie production costs.
Fairly good price and output data are available by
firm and device, however, as are data on the labor
and capital employed on individual fabrication
lines. In what follows, these data are exploited to
provide rough information on the relationships of
interest.
The Behavior ofthe DRAM Industry
We explore here the issues of market structure
rigidity, learning effects, and scale economies in the
context of a particular type of IC device - the
Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) IC.
This device stores binary bits of information in a
randomly accessible manner. (The term "dynamic"
simply refers to the requirement that DRAMs be
powered continuously to retain implanted memory.
The term distinguishes them from a related device
the Static RAM- that does not need continuous
electrical power.) The memory capacity ofDRAMs
is measured in kilobits; each kilobit is 1,024 indi-
vidual bits of memory capacity and is abbreviated
by a "K". To date, DRAM devices have been
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level. These findings probably are consistent with
the existence of important scale economies and,
therefore, limited "room" in the market for addi-
tional firms. Indeed, as the market for 4K devices
matured and declined, the concentration ratio for
4K DRAMS gradually increased as firms exited the
market.
Although firm entry into the market for DRAMs
appears capable ofreducing levels of industry con-
centration for at least short periods of time, new
entrants have difficulty dislodging "first movers".
To illustrate this observation, the orderings offirms
ranked by market share from one year to the next
were compared and astatisticmeasuring thecorrela-
tion ofthese ranks - the Spearman Rank Correla-
tion Coefficient - was computed for each pair of
adjacent years and for each device. (Unchanged
year-to-year rank ordering produces a Spearman
rank correlation coefficientof1.0)25. The results are
presented in Chart 3.
The high correlation of firm market share rank-
ings from one year to the next suggests that DRAM
market structure is not highly fluid after the initial
period of entry, and has with each successive
DRAM device reached this condition of structural
stability more rapidly. Moreover, data not presented
in the chart suggest that the first producers of a
device not only retain pre-eminence in the market
for that device but often are "first movers" into
production of the next generation device. Turnover
of produc~rsis greatest among those firms that are
not first entrants. These observations may suggest
the existence ofhigh fixed costs (either pre-produc-
manufactured in c6mmercial volume in 4K, 16K,
64K and 256K capacities.
We focus on DRAMs for a number of reasons
even though they represented only about 10 percent
of total IC sales worldwide in 1985. First, the
DRAM. device is as close as the semiconductor
industry gets to a "commodity"-type of device.
Most other ICs have qualitative attributes that make
them difficult to study over time or across firms.
Second, unlike microprocessor ICs for example,
DRAMs have beenproduced in significant volumes
by non-U.S. firms, allowing some exploration of
the influence offoreign entry on industry behavior.
Indeed, DRAMswere involved in recent allegations
of "dumping" by the Japanese24. Finally, as a
practical matter, to expand sample sizes, it is neces-
sary to combine data across devices. Such a com-
bination is feasible with memory devices because
they are unambiguously"generic" in theiressential
unit ofservice (the "bit"), and bits are substitutable
across devices.
Substitutability across types of DRAMs is illus-
trated in Chart 1, which shows the actual quantity
shipped in Panel A and actual prices per bit for four
DRAM devices in Panel B. The sales of the 4K
DRAM, for example, peak and decline sharply
(note that all quantities are in log terms) when the
price per bit ofthe successor device (l6K DRAM)
falls below the 4K price per bit. A similar pattern
holds for subsequent generations of devices. The
chart also illustrates vividly the observation made
earlierthat increasing the bitdensity on the chip has
contributed importantly to the observed declines in
price per bit ofDRAM memory.
Market Rigidity
In examining the DRAM market for evidence of
structural rigidity, it is instructive to trace the evolu-
tion of market structure in DRAM manufacture. As
Chart 2 reveals, a new DRAM device typically is
introduced by one or two firms with entry occurring
gradually until concentration (as measured by the
share of the market held by the largest 3 firms)
declines to a relatively modest level.
In the cases ofthe early devices (such as the 4K
DRAM), entry occurred more gradually than with
subsequent generations of devices, and concentra-
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tion or production) or learning phenomena that
benefit incumbent firms.
Scale Economies and Learning Effects
Without specific data onIe production costs, it is
not possible to test directly for the existence and
importanceoflearning in DRAM manufacture, orto
explore directly the magnitude of scale economies.
However, an examination ofthe behavior ofDRAM
prices in addition to the inferences drawn above
from the behavior of market structure may shed
some light on cost behavior. In particular, except in
instances of coordinated or monopoly pricing,
prices and average costs are likely to move together
over time. This relationship suggests that some
inferences about costs can be derived from price
dataifthe circumstances thatmight lead to noncom-
petitivepricing can be controlled.
To explore these relationships more formally (and
to control for the effects of the passage of time,
accumulated production experience, and market
structure), we studied a simple econometric rela-
tionship using quarterly data on DRAM devices
over the 1976 to 1985 period. We studied the
variable the price ofabitofDRAM, and we pooled
time series data on four devices (the 4K, 16K, 64K
and 256K DRAM) to expand the sample size. The
general form ofthe relationship studied was:
Price(x,t) = h[time(x,t), output(x,t), (I)
cumulated output(x,t),
market structure(x,t),




price(x,t) = price per bit, in U.S. dollars for
device x at time t
time(x,t) = t = the date ofthe price observation
on device x
output(x,t) = average industrywide output per
firm (in number of devices), for device x at
time t
cumulative output(x,t) = average device output
per firm summed over time by device, for
device x at time t
market structure(x,t) = 3-firm concentration
ratio in market shares ofdevice x at time t
Japanese market share(x,t) = fraction of total
production by Japanese firms, for device x at
time t
size(x,t) = the memory capacity in bits for
device x at time t
and
x=l, 2, 3, 4
t= 1 to 44 measured from 1974, quarter one
Table 1presents aregression analysis ofaspecific
configuration ofEquation 1. In particular, ordinary
least squares were used to estimate a relationship
between the log ofDRAM prices and the variables
identifiedin Equation 1. Mostofthe coefficients are
made a function of device size by interacting each
variable with the device size measure. All of the
coefficients in Table 1 are measured with consider-
able statistical precision, permitting a number of
interesting observations.
First, the positive coefficient on the Size variable
suggests that (if prices follow costs) increases in
device size increase the costofa bitofDRAM. That
is, with agiven technology, it is more costly(perbit)
to produce large rather than small devices. The
negative coefficients on Time and Time times Size,
however, indicate that technological progress
decreases bit price and that technological progress
has< been most important for large devices. The
positive coefficients on Time Squared and Time
Squared times Size indicate that the influence of
technological change in reducing the bit price are
diminishing with time and with increased device
size over time. This is consistent with the idea of
diminishing returns to size-related innovations and
innovations generally.Second, the negative coefficient on Output and
the positive coefficient on Output Squared implies
that the price per bit declines and then rises with
increased output. This is consistent with the notion
that there are economies ofscale associated with IC
production over some range. The rate offirm output
at which prices begin to rise can be derived from the
estimatedcoefficients and is 5.4 million devices per
quarter for a 64 kilobit device. This rate is over four
times the observed average output and close to the
maximum of 8.53 million devices per quarter
observed in the sample. Itthus offers some comfort
that the use ofprices to study cost behavior may not
be unreasonable.
Third, the negative coefficient on Cumulative
Output indicates that, at least for the industry as a
whole, cumulative output has an effect independent
of that of current output. This finding supports the
hypothesis that learning contributes to IC produc-
tion behavior. Although it is not evident that
50individual firms are able to exploit learning curve
phenomena in devising pricing strategies, it does
indicate that the theoretical potential to do so exists.
Fourth, the positive coefficienton the Concentra-
tion Ratio and the negative coefficient on Size times
the Concentration Ratio suggests that the influence
of market share concentration on DRAM prices is
positive for small devices, but negative for larger
effect becomes negative for a "size"
greater than about 40 kilobits.) As was observed
earlier in this paper, a negative effect of market
share concentration on price is suggestive of firm-
specific strategic pricing in the presence ofa learn-
ing curve. The negative coefficient for 64K and
256K devices is interesting because these are the
device sizes that came to be dominated by the
Japanese, suggesting, perhaps, that the Japanese
introduced a different pricing strategy into the
DRAM Ie market.
The independent effect of Japanese market pres-
ence on DRAM prices is given by the negative
coefficient on Japanese Market Share and the posi-
tive coefficienton Size times Japan Market Share. It
appears that, controlling for other market and pro-
duction influences, the effect ofthe Japanese pres-
ence was to reduce prices for smaller devices
(empirically, smallerthan 57 kilobits), butto elevate
prices for larger devices. Once again, the markets
for larger devices are ones that the Japanese are said
to dominate. Since we have controlled for indus-
trywide learning by Cumulative Output, and early
strategic "underpricing" may be accommodated by
the concentration ratio variables, this finding could
be seen as evidence that prices can be elevated by
successfully dominating the market.
There are a number ofimportant qualifications to
these findings. An obvious difficulty lies with the
study of average and average firm output to
make inferences about what inherently is relevant
to individual firm costs and output. Many
relationships that hold at an individual firm level are
not appropriately aggregated oraveraged. A similar
criticism attaches to the use of average cumulative
output instead of individual firm data to detect the
presence oflearning curve phenomena. More com-
plex functional forms, separate specification of the
estimated relationship for each device, and recogni-
tion of qualitative differences across devices also
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would be useful. The available data, however, does
not allow us to resolve all ofthese potential sources
ofbias.
A Study of Fabrication Facilities
Our second empirical investigation focused on
the fundamental unit of fabrication: the fab line.
This investigation is of interest both to verify the
casual observation made in·Section II about the
likely lack ofscale economies in fabrication and to
study differences in fabrication activity on fab lines
operated by Japanese and American firms. Iffab-
rication costs were the same in both countries, then
such costs would have to be eliminated as a source
of differences in pricing strategies.
Once again, quite severe data limitations restrict
the type and quality of analysis that can be per-
formed. Fab line cost data are not available; only
data on installed capital equipment (in 1986 U.S.
dollars), the number of employees engaged on the
line, and wafer start activity are available. Data on
the specific type of IC device produced on the line
also are not available26. Nevertheless, the data do
permit two simple empirical tests a comparison
ofcapital-labor ratios and a comparison offab line
production functions.
First, using dataon 386fab lines from June 1986,
we computed the capital-labor ratios separately for
American and Japanese fab lines27, and found the
ratio in Japanese fab lines to be approximately 2
percentless than the ratio onAmericanlines28. This
finding is likely an understatement of the actual
difference because the Japanese work week is one
day longer than the 5-day U.S. standard. Thus, for
Japanese lines, the number ofemployees on the fab
line is a downward-biased measure of labor input
flows (in man-days).
The finding ofa 2 percentdifference implies that,
assuming the same fabrication technology and
quality of labor, the unit cost of labor relative to
capital is lower for Japanese than American firms.
Since the capital equipment costs likely are very
similar(since muchofthe equipmentis Americanin
origin), this, in turn, could be consistent with the
existence of absolutely lower labor factor costs in
Japan 29.
The second use ofthe data was to estimate a fab
line production function directly for a combined(2)
sample of Japanese and American fab lines. The
estimated functional fonn was the Cobb-Douglas
representation of the production function:
Q = aLbKc
where
Q = fab lineoutput(measuredin square inches
of wafer starts per week)
L = the number offab line employees
K the dollar value of fab line capital (in
millions of U.S. dollars).
The Cobb-Douglas representation has a number
of well-known limitations, the most important of
which is that the rate ofsubstitutionbetween factors
is constrained to be equal to one. It has the advan-
tage, however, that the exponents oflabor and capi-
tal provide estimates of the marginal products of
these respective factors. It also can be shown that
the relative sizesofthese two coefficients are related
to the relative contribution of each factor to total
product undercertainassumptions, and that the sum
of these coefficients is a measure of economies of
scale30. (Specifically, if b plus c in equation 2 is
greater than one, the production function exhibits
economies of scale; if they sum to less than one,
there are diseconomiesto largescale production.)In
addition, with simple assumptions about factor
prices and the profit-maximizing behavior of the
finn, cost functions can be derived3l.
The estimates of the coefficients of equation 2
were obtained by taking the logarithm ofboth sides
and using ordinary least squares regression tech-
niques. The results are presented in Table 2, with a
dummy variable introduced to identify possible
coefficient differences between American and Jap-
anese fab lines. The coefficients on fab line employ-
ment and fab line capital are, respectively, .54 and
.35 for the American fab lines. It thus appears that
there are no scale economies from fabrication per
se. Indeed, the point estimate of the coefficients
imply very slight diseconomies ofscale (.89 versus
1.00 for constant returns to scale) although the
estimate cannot be distinguished from 1.0 statis-
52ticaUy. The importance of the labor component of
fabrication inputs also is illustrated by the esti-
mates, which show that labor's contribution to total
product is approximately fifty percent greater than
that ofcapitaPZ;
American vs Japanese Production
Functions
There also appear to be no differences in fab line
production functions between American and Jap-
anese facilities. All three ofthe coefficients on the
variables designed to capture these differences (that
is, the Japanese dummy variable and its interaction
with fabrication employment and fabrication capi-
tal) are not statistically different from zero. From
this evidence alone, there is little to suggest that
fabrication economies can explain differences in
final product prices between the two countries. In
other words, ifmanufacturers in each country were
profit-maximizing and faced the same labor and
capital costs, there is no statistical evidence that
total fabrication cost relationships would differ33.
Important qualifications on this finding must be
offered, however. First, the output measure used in
estimating equation 2 is not the number of usable
ICs·completed but simply square inches of wafer
processed. To the extent that Japanese and Ameri-
canfirmsdifferin their ability to recover usable ICs
from this process, effective cost per IC would dif-
fer34•
Second, Japanese and American producers may
emphasize different products not accommodated by
the simple production function estimated here.
Some data are available on coarse product catego-
ries associated with each fab line. However, the use
of separate dummy variables for these categories
did not significantly influence the estimated param-
eters, perhaps because the sample sizes for some of
those product variations were small.
Finally, if the differences in capital-labor ratios
on fab lines observed earlier in the two countries is
indicative ofabsolute differences in labor and capi-
tal costs in the two countries, production costs
would differ accordingly.
V. Conclusions
Although the available data do not permit defini-
tive assessment of the factors that may affect firm
behavior within the IC industry, some lighthas been
shedon two majoraspects ofthe performance ofthis
industry. The first is whetherthe industry is prone to
high levels of market share concentration or other
features that may result in inefficient performance.
Pricing behaviorwas consistentwith sizeable, but
not extreme, overall scale economies, which
include pre-production costs. Market structure in
commodity-type DRAM devices appears to be con-
centrated only at low industry output levels.
Pricing behavior in the DRAM market is,
however, consistent with the existence of a firm-
specific learning effect. In addition, large, "sunk"
pre-production investments are required to enter
new device markets. Bothphenomenawould tendto
give strategic advantages to incumbent firms and
hence to firms (of any nationality) that might be
supported through periods of negative earnings
while they acquire the advantages of production
experience and incumbency.
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The second majorissue confronting the IC indus-
try is the conduct offoreign competitors compared
to U.S. manufacturers. The fact that estimated fab
line production functions did not uncover signifi-
cant intercountry differences casts some doubt on
differences in fabrication costs as a source ofcom-
petitive advantage for Japanese producers.
Weighing against this view is our finding (in the
context of fabrication lines) that firms in Japan
behave as if their labor is less costly (or of lower
quality) relative to capital than firms elsewhere.
Since the conventional wisdom is that Japanese
labor is not of lower quality, the behavior of Jap-
anese firms argues in favor of a cost-advantage to
Japanese production of ICs. Perpetuation of this
disparity runs counter to the notion ofinternational
factor price equilibration predicted by trade theory,
but without additional information, the argument
that cost differences are the basis for the growing
presence of the Japanese in the IC market must
stand.national semiconductor pricing policy. The agree-
ment was reached by negotiation between the U.S.
and Japanese governments to resolve complaints
about Japanese IC pricing policy brought before the
U.S. International Trade Commission and inpeti-
tions filed under Section 301 of the Trade Act of
197435.
The ITC complaints and petitions were dropped
inreturn for agreements from the Japanese.to cease
the alleged practices of(1) retarding U.S. entry into
Japanese markets and (2) "dumping" ofJapanese
products below cost in U.S. markets. In particular,
the agreement provides firms in both countries pro-
tection against "subsidized" sale of semiconduc-
tors (priced below "company specific cost of pro-
duction plus 8 percent"). Also, as part of the
agreement, the Japanese government is charged
with monitoring the relationship between firm costs
and selling prices abroad.
The agreement potentially could proVIde a forum
for resolving the debate about whether the Japanese
producers are, infact, subsidizing IC production. To
the extent that the concept "company specific cost
ofproduction" is meantto referto short-run average
costs, the agreement also could retard learning
curve pricing strategies and thereby improve pros-
pects for American firms. At this writing, however,
the agreement had broken down because of the
alleged failure of the Japanese government to
enforce its terms.
ofthe U.S. Semiconductor
Several ofourfindings suggest that semiconduc-
tor markets lost to foreign competition may be
difficultto recover. For one, assuming that produc-
cost-advantages on·a firm
and growing scale of "sunk" costs is associ-
ated with de novo entry, it follows that new nonsub-
increasingly difficult to
dis;lo(ige incumbent firms, whether that incum-
through cost-advantages or
subsidized operation. Second, although the DRAM
Ulan..\-·., at least, is not especially concentrated at
markets in DRAMs have tended to
become rigidly structured over time.
On a more positive note, two recent policy
changes have important implications for American
firms. First, the passage ofthe SemiconductorChip
Protection Act, by giving property rights to
designers of semiconductor chip maskworks,
should reduce significantly the more egregious
practic;es. The Act will reduce the likelihood
that different firms will face different effective costs
of maskwork capital. If, as is popularly alleged,
foreign firms previously acquired maskwork capital
through reverse engineering at the expense ofAmer-
ican firms, the improvement in property rights in IC
maskworks should benefit American IC producers.
Thesecond importantpolicy initiative is the 1986
agreement reached between the U.S. and Japanese
governments regarding, among other things, inter-
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